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After reading this article you will learn about the problem of objectivity in social inquiry.
The problem of objectivity is one of knowing reality. In addition to questions related to being, objectivity involves two other considerations, viz., the correct method of dealing with any question and of how we know anything (Epistemology).
It has been argued that the social scientists are of necessity and by advertence less objective than the natural scientists since social scientists, are themselves human beings, living in societies, do have certain social interests. They are participants in social movements and accept certain values and ways of life.
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The problem in the nature of a relative lack of objectivity, i.e., of emotional detachment, arises from the fact that the social scientists have a large stake in the outcome of their studies, that is, their own interests may be affected by the findings of their inquiries and their wishes may seriously influence the results of their studies.
The folkways, mores and social usages usually come to be accepted as naturally valid and thus appear to provide complete and adequate schemes of living and thinking for members. For a social scientist to detach himself from them is often an extremely difficult task, and he runs the risk of unconsciously using them to prejudge the social situations he studies.
It is, the argument runs, a major psychological feat to achieve objectivity required for scientific inquiry especially on those frequent occasions when the inquiry is likely to challenge the existing frames of social reference.
The critics assert that the general circumstances of the social inquiry are such as to prevent the social scientists from using the evidence at their disposal dispassionately. The social observers so to speak, are placed in the hands of their own observation.
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We must consider precisely the influences which may prevent the social scientists from taking full account of the evidence at their disposal.
These influences may be summed up as adverse influences of:
(1) Personal motives,
(2) Custom and
(3) Social situation of which the social scientists himself is a part.
An inquirer should not let his beliefs be influenced by the above factors. Objectivity by itself will not, however, ensure that an inquirer will come to hold rational beliefs but failure in objectivity will certainly prevent him from holding such beliefs.
We cannot help admitting that one’s motives do sometimes affect beliefs adversely; at times leading him to adopt beliefs without considering evidence at all or to make a defective estimate of the evidence. “Prejudice and biases are like fantasies — to believe what is comforting to believe.”
When our motives predispose us in this way to believe something that is comforting without good evidence, we are, of course, rarely aware that this is so. At any time, there are many habits of thought which simply because they are generally accepted, are not easy to detect.
While effects adverse to objectivity may be produced, when a person’s social situation gives rise to certain interests, leading in turn to prejudice and bias, it cannot be denied that in some cases the effect of social situation may in no way be inconsistent with objectivity, since all it may do is to impose limits on the availability of evidence.
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There are cases, however, where an effect adverse to objectivity arises in the form of an intellectual error consisting in placing undue weightage on evidence which is near at hand. This evidence in turn varies with the person’s social situation, i.e., his place in the social structure.
Having considered the influences adversely affecting objectivity, we may now ask whether these influences are so potent as to render an objective social inquiry impossible. Doubtless, these influences have some effect on the beliefs of the social inquirers.
Denying objectivity (to social enquirers) must be understood as influences being so powerful as to prevent normally the accomplishing of worthwhile results. One reasonable way to refute this charge would be to point out that these influences have been overestimated. The onus is on the critics to establish their case and it would suffice if it was shown that they fail to put it up.
We may approach the estimation of objectivity in two ways:
(a) We may ask in general terms what effects the general circumstances of social inquiry are likely to have on the objectivity of the scientist pursuing it.
(b) We may also do well to start with particular social theories and ask what influences might have contributed to their acceptance and generalize from this.
Some of the typical considerations which have prompted critics to doubt the realization of objectivity in social enquiry may, after a careful appraisal, be dismissed as irrelevant, as would be clear from the following discussion.
Thus, failure of objectivity in social inquiries is often attributed to the simple fact that the social scientist as a social being is also actively participating is social affairs. In answering this objection, That the biologist is himself an organism and a physicist also a body of given mass, interacting with other organisms and bodies.
Simply for this reason that the theories of the biologist and the physicist would be unduly subject to the influence of biological and physical environments, at the expense of evidence.
By the same token, assume that the interaction of the social scientist with his social environment will interfere with his objectivity and rationality. Indeed, no one is casually detached from the subject-matter he is investigating.
Those who accuse social scientists of lacking in detachment from their social environment generally point to the special potency of interests and emotions which are centered around their interrelationships with other people. In this regard, we should not forget that potent interests and emotions do not inevitably give rise to prejudice or bias.
They only do so that where satisfaction is gained by our escaping from or evading the difficulties rather than by overcoming them. Our interests do incline us towards prejudice and bias when we are dealing with social questions.
Individuals do not find it easy to alter the course of events to their own liking and/or where there is a practical programme to be carried out, a realistic or objective appraisal of means and assets becomes inevitable. Where there is nothing effective that is desired be done, we may possibly relish the luxury of prejudice.
The effect of ‘vested interests’ on people’s beliefs. It is obvious that those who enjoy a position of distinct advantage in terms of wealth, power and prestige etc. under the existing system and dispensation do not wish to disturb the status quo and often resist changes even in the superficial overtones of the integral structure.
But ordinarily, this in itself would not distort their views about the factual working of the system and its effect on other members who are a part of it. Distortion of views about the actual state of affairs implies the presence of certain incompatible motives such as a vital concern for fellowmen who can be helped only by a modification of the existing social order.
A practical way to avoid this conflict is and has been to presume that the existing order contains benefits for one and all and each one is free to share them as a matter of course.
We cannot afford to overlook the fact that social prejudices and custom-based beliefs, irrespective of the truth-value of their content, do have their own peculiar form of survival value. Considering carefully their manifest and latent functions for society, it may be said that social prejudices do sometimes pay, and deliver social goods of significant import.
An irrational faith in the justness and virtue of a cause may serve as an energizer, providing the necessary impetus to persons to carry it on to a point of fruition, whereas an unbiased and critical appraisal of evidence may provide just that discouragement which so often results in failure.
To the extent this occurs, comforting beliefs cannot be easily written off from the popular mind. The custom-based beliefs generally contribute to social cohesion and stability. It is precisely this that makes them less susceptible to challenge and erosion.
Social beliefs are especially vulnerable to the influence of differing points of view. Since social situations are more varied compared to physical ones, it follows that the readiness to generalize from the evidence near at hand will have more drastic consequences.
That people belonging to different social positions or living at different periods of time will most likely have their social theories tainted by distorting effects unparalleled in the physical sciences is, therefore, not difficult to visualize.
The above considerations have a general and extensive applicability. There are hardly any special circumstances which can claim immunity from such distorting factors. Karl Mannheim has suggested that a detached intellectual with no social class affiliations will probably be able to achieve a measure of objectivity which may well be beyond the reach of others.
But the mere fact of detachment of this kind does not necessarily ensure that the desired results would follow. For, howsoever one may wish, the fact remains that the intellectual has also a special position which is likely to distort his view of evidence.
Again, he is not above the special interests in practical terms, such as the need to maintain his standard of living or even, his desire to preserve his scholarly seclusion and detachment.
It has been shown that especial dangers confront the social scientist. But it is also seen that these are not sufficient to establish the ubiquitous inability of the social enquirers to base their conclusions on nothing but evidence.
With reference to the special dangers to which the social scientist as a representative of a class has been made out to be especially subject it may be asked whether the social enquirers do typically succumb to these. The answer to this question must wait till we have considered at some length, the working of the influences referred to above as these relate to the origin of social theories.
In this connection we may have to examine whether the theory a person holds is one which he would hold if he were to notice only those facts that were near at hand (because of his situation) or lastly, whether the theory is similar to those currently held.
If we notice that the differences between theories held by persons reflect the differences in interests, customs and social situations, this would more or less support the view that these factors have had some subtle part in shaping the theories.
It must be remembered, however, that the mere fact of a person’s views and reactions happening to coincide with his interests, motives etc. cannot be a really firm basis for inferring that the theories are not based on a proper consideration of evidence. It would be erroneous to suppose that a person’s theories must always clash with his interests before he can claim any measure of objectivity.
The argument is more cogent admittedly, where there is objectivity. The argument is more cogent admittedly, where there are different views on the same question. The absence of an agreed conclusion is a sign that certain persons have not taken full account of the evidence.
In the absence of any reliable direct measure of objectivity, the usual practice is to fall back upon a simple and well-thumbed measure, i.e., to ask whether the theory is or is not a reasonable one to hold. If someone puts forward a theory for which evidence is insufficient and we know that he is unlikely to make a mistake through failure of intelligence, it will follow that his objectivity is at fault.
The use of this kind of a test, however, presupposes that we are capable of considering the evidence for ourselves and that our own conclusions would be free from bias. It is, therefore, useless to ascertain whether or not the social enquirers at large lack objectivity since we must ourselves be included in this group.
It would thus seem that we ought to dismiss as inconclusive the attempts to establish that there is a general failure of objectivity among social scientists, to the extent that their enquiries are rendered futile and worthless. This being so, we may not feel it necessary to pursue the matter any further.
But then those who make the attempt, run the risk of succumbing to their own charge. For, an enquiry into the origin of social theories principally belongs to the general rubric of social inquiries and hence any theory about the origin of social theory must equally apply to itself.
The critic of objectivity is thus involved in a deep-rooted circularity. This point, of course, hardly helps to establish the lack of objectivity of social scientists.
The only conceivable way to avoid this difficulty would be to claim that statements about the origin of theories form a special class by themselves and therefore are exempt from the general charge. It is, of course, true that ‘theories’ about the origin of theories differ from theories about other kinds of social facts.
But these are not good enough grounds to suppose that this difference is relevant when it comes to estimating the degree of objectivity of those who put them forward.
It may be added that it is very comforting to explain away the theories of the opponents, for in so doing, we avoid facing their arguments. This is why this sort of polemic often indulged in. In any case, it can hardly be claimed, that those who investigate the origins of social theories must exhibit an objectivity which others lack.
We may conclude that a tight case has not been made against the feasibility of effective objectivity in social inquiry. The dangers, however, are present and if we wish to proceed scientifically, we must find the best means of avoiding these.
From what has been said so far, it should be plain that it is not sufficient merely to try to avoid the dangers by seeking a special position of detachment. Those who try to keep themselves above the battle cannot but have their own social interests and points of view. No one lives in a social vacuum. Loyalty to scientific procedure demands that no one should ignore the possible sources of adverse influences on his beliefs.
Ultimately then, the true remedy seems to lie in making oneself conscious of these influences. To admit that one’s theories may have been socially conditioned does not, in itself, stop these theories from being thus conditioned. But, it may help alter them for the simple reason that neither prejudice nor influence of custom survive detection for long.
The efficacy of this remedy should not, however, be overestimated, for it does not help to overcome distortions which are simply due to the limitations of one’s social situation. Even in the case of other influences, it is well worth remembering that they are often extremely difficult to identify and detect.
In view of those limitations, it may be necessary to resort to another remedy in the form of controversy. If all with the same evidence at their disposal took a perfect account of it, all would arrive at the same conclusions, hence the possibility of disputes between them may not be ruled out.
But this does not unfortunately happen for reasons discussed earlier. An effective way to eliminate these influences would be to bring the different theorists together and ensure that they are able to engage in an open criticism of one another without the fear of consequences.
Criticism, in the ultimate analysis, is one of the most important forms of co-operation. To label the activity of a critic as destructive is misleading. By pointing to a person that he has departed from the right path, we help him and his followers.
This is thus a positive contribution for the larger institution of science. For “invalidation, no less than verification of proposition is a progress in inquiry. As Karl Pearson aptly remarks, “criticism is the very life-blood of science.”
Left to ourselves, we may fall an easy prey to influences detrimental to objectivity. We do not easily become aware of our own biases, unreflective presuppositions or limitations of our own points of view; we need, most of the time, to have them pointed out to us by others.
A heavy stress on the intellectual and mutual understanding among scientists particularly the social scientists, is now warranted. The power of argument rests on this understanding and when the foundation is too weak, it is the argument of power that triumphs.
Ensuring that social enquiry is, in a real sense, a “competitive, collective enterprise” would guarantee such measure of objectivity as we can lay claim on. We must admit our present imperfections; the failure to do so would amount to a divorcement from truth, the cause we are wedded to.
We need to realize that we have a long way to go and that in social sciences what is needed more than ever is perfecting of tools which will register, record and classify finer qualitative distinctions and finally, that we lack the adequate testing and verification procedures for the intangible though very real aspects of social reality and human nature.
Such an honest admission unto ourselves, would act as a spur to our persistent efforts aimed at unearthing of “that knowledge which will arm man for his greatest victory; the conquest of himself.”